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Directed Trustee Liability Under ERISA
DAVID L. HEALD*
JOSEPH P. MULHERN III**
INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten to fifteen years, directed trusts' have increased
in popularity2 among sponsors of employee benefit plans.' This prac-
tice of conferring investment authority on one other than the trustee
was prompted by a number of factors. Employee benefit plans were
growing rapidly in number and in size, generating significantly
larger pools of assets to be managed.' Investment management
* Attorney, The First National Bank of Chicago. B.A. Denison University (1966); J.D.
Vanderbilt University (1969).
** Attorney, The First National Bank of Chicago. B.A. Notre Dame (1971); J.D. North-
western University (1974). The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors
and not necessarily those of the First National Bank of Chicago.
1. A directed trust is one in which powers normally exercised by the trustee-typically,
authority to make investment decisions-are delegated to one or more third parties. These
delegatees then instruct or "direct" the trustee to implement their decisions. For a more
comprehensive analysis of the form and function of directed trusts, see text accompanying
notes 14-17 infra.
2. The trend in the late 1960's toward use of multiple investment managers, or "fund-
splitting," was one indication of the increased interest in directed trusts. This trend has been
documented and discussed by numerous commentators. See, e.g., SECURrrIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT 1285 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SEC
INVESTOR REPORT]; Belliveau, Is Discretionary Management of Pension Funds in Jeopardy?,
PENSIONS, Spring, 1972, at 47; Dreher & Rogers, Five Years of Splitting: What Have We
Learned?, PENSIONS, Winter, 1973, at 29 [hereinafter cited as Dreher & Rogers]; Friedes, Too
Many Cooks Don't Spoil the Broth, PENSION & WELFARE NEWS, Oct., 1971, at 30 [hereinafter
cited as Friedes]; Rogers, How Pension Funds Will Be Managed Tomorrow, PENSION &
WELFARE NEWS, Dec., 1971, at 54 [hereinafter cited as Rogers]; Whitworth, A Compass
Needed for Direction Trusts, 111 TRUSTS & EST. 698, 740 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Whit-
worth].
3. For purposes of this article, the term "employee benefit plan" is used to encompass
both pension and profit sharing plans. Both are designed to provide retirement benefits for
employees and both may be funded by means of directed trusts. The primary difference
between them is in the type of contributions the employer makes. In a pension, or defined
benefit plan, the ultimate benefits are established and actuaries determine the amounts and
the frequency of employer contributions necessary to provide those benefits. In a profit shar-
ing, or defined contribution plan, the employer contributes a percentage of profits from time
to time, and the plan provides a formula for calculating employees' interests in the fund. SEC
INVESTOR REPORT, supra note 2, at 1285.
4. For example, the number of qualified retirement plans increased from 10,000 in 1946
to more than 150,000 by the end of 1967. Comment, Separable Liabilities of Trustees in
Directory Trusts, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 n.1 (1972), citing [1970] 1 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH)
503 (1970). The market value of assets of private non-insured qualified and non-qualified
pension and profit sharing funds increased from $45 billion in 1961 to more than $105 billion
in 1971. Id., citing SEC Statistical Series Release No. 2564, [1972] 3 PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) 25,172. See generally Comment, Separable Liabilities of Trustees in Directory
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firms, awakening to this growth, were increasing their marketing
efforts to capture a portion of the burgeoning business. Plan spon-
sors' were becoming disenchanted with the historical investment
performance by trustees7 and were placing increased emphasis on
performance of their funds' assets.'
The directed trust appeared to be a logical and generally accepta-
ble means of allocating the management of plan assets. Investment
decisions were vested in one or more investment managers' who, in
the opinion of the plan sponsor, were more performance-oriented
than a corporate trustee. Plan sponsors commonly felt that this type
of trust insulated them from litigation for poor performance of the
trust assets. Trustees generally, although not without considerable
hesitation, agreed to participate in directed trusts despite the fact
that the investment decisions they were required to implement were
Trusts, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Separable Liabilities]. The
amount of assets in private insured and non-insured pension funds more than doubled be-
tween 1960 and 1969, and the book value of public pension funds almost doubled during the
same period. Weirick, Passive Money Management is Dead, PENSION & WELFARE NEWS, Dec.,
1970, at 37 [hereinafter cited as Weirick]. The SEC, in investigating, pension investments
from 1964 to 1969, noted that all portfolio groups experienced growth in terms of both common
stock holdings and total assets. SEC INVESTOR REPORT, supra note 2, at 1288. Some felt that
these increased assets were too unwieldy for the traditional single manager to handle. See,
e.g., Dreher & Rogers, supra note 2, at 31.
5. The number of independent investment counsel firms increased dramatically in the
late 1960's, most with the specific objective of offering management assistance to large funds.
See generally Rogers, supra note 2, at 54. Typical of their marketing efforts were a spate of
articles written by managers and designed to reinforce the need for their services. See, e.g.,
Weirick, supra note 4, at 37.
6. The plan sponsor customarily is the company or companies whose employees receive
benefits under the plan.
7. For example, corporate trustees have been criticized for placing too much emphasis on
preservation of principal and too little on appreciation. See generally Cronin, Effectiveness
of Exculpatory Clauses in Directory Trusts, 98 TRusTs & EST. 1147 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as Cronin]. The view that trustees tend to invest conservatively is widespread. See, e.g.,
Weirick, supra note 4, at 42; Whitworth, supra note 2, at 699; Note, Directory Trusts and
the Exculpatory Clause, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 138-39 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Directory
Trusts]. Cf. SEC INVESTOR REPORT, supra note 2, at 1007, 1288. That report disclosed that,
despite a general trend toward diversity of management, bank management still predomi-
nated in corporate pension benefit plans in the late 1960's.
8. In response to an SEC study, 110 out of 135 plans questioned responded "yes" to the
question: "Does the employer attempt to measure the 'performance' of any of the plan's
managers?" The Commission concluded that plans therefore were becoming increasingly
alert to the investment return on their accounts. SEC INVESTOR REPORT, supra note 2, at 1008.
For recognition and discussion of this "performance cult," see Bagnall, Alternatives in Invest-
ment Management, PENSION & WELFARE NEWS, December, 1970, at 31; Cronin, supra note 7,
at 1147; Friedes, supra note 2, at 30; Kumler, Money Management Capabilities of Regional
Bank Trust Departments, 111 TRusTS & EST. 28 (1972).
9. Typically, the investment managers are independent investment management firms,
although insurance companies and investment departments of large banks also participate
to a lesser degree.
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made by investment managers. Directed trustees took comfort in
exculpatory provisions'0 which afforded them needed protection
from liability for acting in accordance with the managers' direc-
tions, or for failure to act in the absence of directions.
The enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)" has raised substantial problems for the directed
trustee. The Act prohibits exculpatory clauses and has raised con-
siderable confusion over the scope of liability of the directed trustee
for activities of the investment adviser. This article will explain the
form and function of the directed trust. It will explore the scope of
the directed trustee's liability for investment decisions before
ERISA, and it will analyze the problems raised by ERISA. Finally,
it will propose means by which the directed trustee can comply with
the letter and spirit of ERISA and, at the same time, protect itself
from unwarranted liability for the acts of investment advisers.
FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE DIRECTED TRUST
Employee benefit plans usually are sponsored by companies seek-
ing retirement benefits for their employees and typically are funded
by means of trusts. The sponsor creates a trust and appoints an
individual or corporate trustee. Under the terms of the trust instru-
ment, the trustee normally takes legal title to the fund assets and
may assume a variety of administrative duties including bookkeep-
ing and accounting, preparation of data necessary for reports or
10. For an analysis of the form and effectiveness of exculpatory, or "hold harmless,"
provisions, see text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
11. Act of September 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). All references in
this article will be to ERISA sections embodied as the Pension Reform Act and codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1975).
12. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (Supp. V 1975) provides: "Except as provided
in sections 405(b)(1) and 405(d), any provision in an agreement or instrument which purports
to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty
under this part shall be void as against public policy." For discussion of the limits of that
prohibition and the problems arising from its enactment, see text accompanying notes 39-40
infra.
13. "Corporate trustee" is a term of art describing any trustee which is not a natural
person. Corporate trustees commonly are banks or trust companies. This article focuses on
the directed corporate trustee and the legal authority and policy issues that determine its
liability for decisions of investment managers. For example, it has been argued that the
conduct of professional trustees, who most often are corporate trustees, should be measured
by a higher standard of prudence than the "casual" trustee. See Cronin, supra note 7; Note,
Standard of Care for Corporate and Professional Trustees, 42 VA. L. REv. 665 (1956); Note,
Standards of Care for Corporate Trustees, 16 U. CI. L. REv. 579 (1949). Numerous cases have
found the professional trustee's particular expertise significant. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Beach, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 542 P.2d 994 (1975); Killey Trust, 457 Pa. 474, 326 A.2d 372 (1974).
Nevertheless, both the statutory and decisional law discussed would apply similarly to corpo-
rate and individual trustees.
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other disclosures required by federal or local law, custody of trust
property, maintenance of records, and collection, payment, and dis-
tribution of fund assets." In the traditional non-directed retirement
trust, the trustee also has discretionary authority over the invest-
ment of the fund's assets.
In a directed trust, however, appropriate provisions are included
in the trust instrument 5 that expressly authorize the delegation of
investment responsibility to a party other than the trustee, custom-
arily one or more professional investment managers. 6 The trust
agreement ordinarily requires the trustee to follow the manager's
instructions. The trustee generally has no control over the decision
to delegate this discretionary responsibility, and rarely does it have
or want any voice in the choice of the manager. It merely is advised
of the appointment of the manager. Thereafter, the manager makes
all the investment decisions and directs the trustee to implement
them.
DIRECTED TRUSTEE LIABILITY BEFORE ERISA
The primary purpose of the directed trust is to take investment
authority out of the control of the trustee and place it in the control
of an investment manager. The directed trustee, however, remains
a fiduciary 7 even in its primarily administrative or custodial capac-
14. For a detailed description of the fiduciary functions of the traditional and directed
trustee, see Separable Liabilities, supra note 4, at 1155, 1157-61.
15. A typical provision reads:
The Company, by any two officers, may direct the Trustee to segregate all or a
portion of the Trust Fund in a separate investment account or accounts and may
appoint an investment manager, as defined in the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 as heretofore or hereafter amended, to direct the investment
and reinvestment of each such investment account or accounts. In such event, the
Company, by any two officers, shall notify the Trustee of the appointment of such
investment manager. Thereafter, the Trustee shall make every sale or investment
as directed in writing by the investment manager. It shall be the duty of the Trustee
to act strictly in accordance with each direction. The Trustee shall be under no duty
to question any such direction of the investment manager, to review any securities
or other property held in any such investment account or accounts acquired by it
pursuant to such directions or to make any recommendations to the investment
manager with respect to such securities or other property. The Trustee may rely
upon any order, certificate, notice, direction or other documentary confirmation
purporting to have been issued by the investment manager. The Trustee shall not
be charged with knowledge of the termination of the appointment of any invest-
ment manager until it receives written notice thereof from the Company.
16. For purposes of convenience, this article will assume that the hypothetical plans
discussed have only one investment manager. In reality, the number and types of managers
vary depending on the size and the particular needs of the plan.
17. See generally 2 A. Sco'rr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS §§ 169-185 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Scorr], and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs §§ 169-185 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT SECOND] for various fiduciary duties which are independent of the trustee's
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ity.11 Understandably, the pre-ERISA directed trustee was con-
cerned about its potential liability for the subsequent acts or omis-
sions of the manager.
The trustee's rights and responsibilities in general are determined
by traditional trust law. 9 Investment authority is a discretionary,
as opposed to a ministerial, power, and traditional trust law prohib-
its a trustee from delegating this discretionary power. 0 In a directed
trust, however, it is the settlor, i.e., the company, and not the trus-
tee who entrusts the investment control to the third party. It is well
established that the settlor has the right to allocate discretionary
authority in the trust agreement to achieve its particular goals.', In
the typical directed trust, therefore, the directed trustee has little
concern that it will be held responsible for the company's decision
to divest the trustee of one of its traditional duties.
Despite the directed trustee's express lack of authority over in-
vestment decisions, pre-ERISA trust law suggested that the trustee
could be held liable for improper decisions of the investment man-
ager. Although there are no relatively recent reported decisions
construing a trustee's liability in the typical directed retirement
trust, it long has been held that a trustee has certain responsibilities
to police the exercise of any power of control which is held in a
fiduciary capacity." The general consensus was that a party empow-
investment authority. For example, the trustee has an independent duty of loyalty. Because
of the trustee's fiduciary relationship to the beneficiaries of the trust, it must administer the
trust solely in their interests. ScoTT at § 170; RESTATEMENT SECOND at § 170.
18. For an analysis of the custodial nature of the directed trustee's function, see Separable
Liabilities, supra note 4, at 1157-62.
19. Even though traditional trust doctrines are creatures of state law, courts nationwide
have consistently relied on Professor Austin Scott's six volume treatise entitled THE LAW OF
TRUSTS, now in its third edition, and on the RESTATEMENT OF TRusTS SECOND, of which Scott
was the primary drafter. Pension trusts created before the passage of ERISA also were subject
to various federally created rights and obligations. For example, plans that met federal
qualifications were entitled to favorable tax treatment. Certain plans were bound also by
federal disclosure requirements. SEC INVESTOR REPORT, supra note 2, at 1285-87.
20. See SCOTT, supra note 17, at § 171.2 and RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17, at §
171 for the general rule that a trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries not to delegate to
others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform.
Any such delegations ordinarily are to be evaluated by asking what a prudent trustee would
have done. However, both ScoTr and RESTATEMENT SECOND specify that a trustee cannot
properly delegate to another the power to select investments.
21. See ScoTT, supra note 17, at § 37 and RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17, at § 37
which say that a trust is valid whether powers involving the administration of the trust are
reserved by the settlor or delegated to a third party.
22. See generally Scon, supra note 17, at § 185 and RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17,
at § 185, comment d. These commentaries conclude that where the power of control is
exercisable for the benefit of the holder alone or some designated parties instead of for the
benefit of the trust beneficiaries generally, the power is held in a non-fiduciary capacity. In
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ered to make investment decisions and direct the trustee to imple-
ment them served in a fiduciary capacity.23 Even when the trustee
was compelled by the trust agreement to follow the directions of the
holder of this power of control, the trustee's compliance was not
justified when it knew or reasonably should have known that the
holder of the power was acting in violation of its fiduciary duty.24
The most authoritative pre-ERISA trust commentaries analogized
the duty of a directed trustee to that of a co-trustee with respect to
the acts of the other co-trustees. 2 It was suggested that a trustee
who was directed to follow a third party's investment decisions had
a duty to investigate the appropriateness of any directed invest-
ments. 2 The trustee further was obligated to inform the third party
of any abuses of discretion it detected and to refrain from imple-
menting any directions it felt were improper.27 If the third party
refused to withdraw the objectionable directions, the trustee was
under a fiduciary duty to apply to the court for instructions or for
permission not to implement the third party's requests. 28
that situation the trustee should not be held liable for complying with the holder's directions,
so long as the directions do not violate the terms of the trust.
23. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17, at § 185, comment c, provides that "a power
given to some third person, who is expert in the making of investments, to control the trustee
in disposing of or acquiring trust investments, would ordinarily be a power for the benefit of
the beneficiaries of the trust generally." For a similar view, see also Blanchard, Pension
Investment Peformance vs. Fiduciary Responsibility, 110 TRUSTS & EST. 666 (1971). Although
there is a dearth of case law construing the status of investment advisers in directed retire-
ment trusts, numerous cases have concluded that various analogous non-interested third
parties who held powers of control exercised their powers in. a fiduciary capacity. See, e.g.,
Allen v. Nunnally, 180 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1950) (power of son of settlor to revoke, alter,
or amend the trust was held in a fiduciary capacity); Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 249,
128 A.2d 819, 828 (1957), aff'd sub. nom. Hanson v. Denckla, 257 U.S. 235 (1958) (trust
adviser with power to limit the trustee's powers to sell trust property, to invest the proceeds
of any sale of trust property, and to participate in any plan of merger or reorganization of
any company in which trust proceeds had been invested was a fiduciary); United States Nat'l
Bank of Portland v. First Nat'l Bank of Portland, 172 Ore. 683, 695-96, 142 P.2d 785, 790
(1943), clarified in 143 P.2d 909 (1943) (consultant bank which was given the power to retain
custody of the securities forming the corpus of the estate, to collect dividends and do inciden-
tal accounting and reporting, and to veto all changes in investments or new investments acted
for the protection of the beneficiaries and was a fiduciary); Gathright's Trustee v. Gaut, 276
Ky. 562, 565, 124 S.W.2d 782, 783-84 (1939) (advisers whose consent was required before the
executor could buy or sell property for the trust had duties and status similar to those of
trustees and should be considered as co-trustees with limited authority).
24. Scor, supra note 17, at § 185; RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17, at § 185.
25. Scorr, supra note 17, at § 185; RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17, at § 185, comment
e. For general discussion of the duties and liabilities of co-trustees, see Sco'rr at §§ 184, 224
and RESTATEMENT SECOND at §§ 184, 224.
26. ScOTr, supra note 17, at § 185.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17, at § 185, comment e. The cases
construing directed trustees' liability for failing to apply to the courts for bills of particulars,
instructions, injunctive relief, etc., are almost all mechanical applications of the rule an-
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These strictures were both unreasonable in theory and unduly
burdensome in practice. The directed trust was specifically de-
signed to remove the trustee's traditional investment discretion and
substitute the judgment of an investment adviser. Requiring the
trustee to police the manager's exercise of that judgment contra-
vened that underlying purpose by interposing the trustee's judg-
ment as a check on the adviser's judgment. The trust instrument
usually required the trustee to comply with the adviser's decisions.
The courts' and commentators' co-trustee liability theory effec-
tively neutralized that express provision, thereby frustrating the
company's intent.
The directed trust also was viewed by the company as a way of
allocating particular duties among the parties. The adviser special-
ized in investment management and the directed trustee concen-
trated on the various administrative functions. Any efficiencies pro-
moted by this division of labor were undermined substantially by
the co-trustee liability theory, for it effectively forced the trustee to
monitor extensively, if not duplicate, the work of the investment
adviser. It also required the trustee to invoke court assistance to
resolve disputes over the propriety of investment decisions. These
procedures were expensive for the trust and unduly cumbersome for
the trustee who supposedly was not to be involved in the investment
decision-making process.
In order to avoid this anomalous result, parties to pre-ERISA
employee benefit trusts often agreed to incorporate exculpatory pro-
visions into their trust agreements. The typical exculpatory section
was designed to hold the directed trustee harmless for the acts of
the investment adviser so long as the trustee did not act in bad faith
or engage in gross negligence or willful misconduct.9 It was reasona-
ble to deduce that the directed trustee, therefore, would not be held
liable for implementing the adviser's decisions unless the trustee
actively collaborated in the challenged decisions.
Many courts approved the practice of incorporating exculpatory
nounced in ScoTr and the RESTATEMENT SECOND. Therefore, a recitation of the cases is of little
additional value. Some of these cases, however, are digested in SCOTT at § 185. For further
analysis of the sources of common law liability of directed trustees, see ABA Committee on
Investments by Fiduciaries, Responsibility of Trustee Where Investment Power is Shared or
Exercised by Others, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 517 (1974).
29. A sample exculpatory provision is as follows:
The Trustee shall not be liable or responsible for any loss resulting to the Trust
Fund by reason of any sale or investment made or other action taken pursuant to
and in accordance with the direction of the person or persons having the power to
direct the same or for the failure to take any action in the absence of any direction.
19781
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provisions into trust instruments. 3 Agreements exonerating trustees
from liability, however, often were carefully scrutinized and strictly
construed.' On various occasions courts held them ineffective to
excuse bad faith, gross negligence, or willful misconduct by the
trustee. 32 Nevertheless, directed trustees felt that they did conform
to those guidelines and so took comfort in the protection afforded
by the provisions. 33 Further, many realized that the courts had eval-
uated exculpatory agreements in the context of personal, trusts
which generally involved unsophisticated parties. Trustees pri-
vately anticipated that courts would fully endorse such provisions
in retirement trusts which generally involved more sophisticated
parties.
The protection afforded the directed trustee by exculpatory agree-
ments made it possible to design an employee benefit trust which
30. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 450 (1938) (up-
holding exculpatory clauses by implication by noting that every trustee has a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the custody of the fiduciary estate unless excused by agreement, statute,
or order of a court); Thompson v. Hays, 11 F.2d 244, 248 (8th Cir. 1926) (upholding right of
parties to a trust to agree to exculpate the trustee for all but willful defaults); Browning v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321, 324 (3d Cir. 1918) (stating as a general proposition that parties
creating a trust can agree to limit the trustee's liability); Morrissey v. Curran, 351 F. Supp.
775, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that exculpatory provisions could protect a trustee from
liability resulting from negligence); Newhouse v. Canal Nat'l Bank of Portland, 124 F. Supp.
239, 249 (S.D. Maine 1954) (noting that although courts will strictly construe exoneration
clauses, they generally will uphold them in the absence of bad faith or profit realized by the
trustee); New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 549-50, 59 N.E.2d 263, 269-70 (1945)
(holding an exculpatory provision valid to excuse a negligent or intentional breach of trust
so long as there was no intent also to cause loss). See also Directory Trusts, supra note 7, at
140-41 for a more detailed list of cases upholding exculpatory clauses.
31. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Curran, 351 F. Supp. 775, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Rippey v.
Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718 (D. Colo. 1967); Newhouse v. Canal Nat'l
Bank of Portland, 124 F. Supp. 239, 249 (S.D. Maine 1954). Commentators have also noted
the trend to strictly construe these provisions. See generally ScoTr, supra note 17, at § 222;
RESTATEMENT SE cOND, supra note 17, at § 222, comment a; Knecht, Trust Adviser: Boon or
Booby Trap, 94 TRusTs & EST. 815, 818 (1955); Directory Trusts, supra note 7, at 141.
32. See, e.g., Thompson v. Hays, 11 F.2d 244, 248 (8th Cir. 1926) (clause ineffective to
excuse willful default); Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321, 324 (3d Cir. 1918); Morris-
sey v. Curran, 351 F. Supp. 775, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Newhouse v. Canal Nat'l Bank of
Portland, 24 F. Supp. 239, 249 (S.D. Maine 1954). Exculpatory provisions have on occasion
been considered contrary to public policy. On occasion they also have been held ineffective
because the breach of trust complained of did not fall within the scope of the exculpatory
provision or because the provision was inserted in violation of a fiduciary or confidential
relation between the settlor and the party covered by the provision. See generally ScowT,
supra note 17, at §§ 222, 222.1, 222.3, 222.4; RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 17, at § 222
and comments b, c, and d thereunder.
33. One often cited commentary lists 8 limitations on the effectiveness of exculpatory
clauses. Nevertheless, the author concludes that they can offer important protection for the
directed trustee, especially when they are broadly written and when they are used as an
adjunct to the trustee's carefully extended powers. Cronin, supra note 7, at 1148. Another
commentator details reasonable measures the directed trustee can take to ensure maximum
protection from an exculpatory provision. Whitworth, supra note 2, at 701.
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maintained the sponsor's right to allocate investment authority,
while freeing the trustee from the burden of unwarranted, expen-
sive, and duplicative monitoring activities. Within that structure,
a corporate trustee found it feasible to accept a position as a di-
rected trustee and discharge its administrative duties according to
the terms of the trust instrument.
DIRECTED TRUSTEE LIABILITY AFTER ERISA
ERISA at once clarifies and confuses the scope of liability of the
various parties involved in directed trusts. The Act tacitly approves
the concept of the directed retirement trust; it establishes proce-
dures whereby a "named fiduciary" 4-generally the plan sponsor or
administrator-may appoint an investment manager to control the
investment of trust assets.3 5 This statutory sanction makes it clear
that the company's delegation of investment authority is permissi-
ble. Sections 405(c)(1) and (2) imply that the appointing fiduciary
will not be liable for the subsequent investment performance of the
fund, provided the named fiduciary exercises reasonable judgment
and care in the selection of the investment manager and continues
to review the wisdom of the appointment on a periodic basis.',
34. ERISA § 402(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
For purposes of this title, the term "named fiduciary" means a fiduciary who is
named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant to a procedure specified in the
plan, is identified as a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an employer or employee
organization with respect to the plan or (B) by such an employer and such an
employee organization acting jointly.
35. ERISA § 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
(c) Any employee benefit plan may provide-
(3) that a person who is a named fiduciary with respect to control or management
of the assets of the plan may appoint an investment manager or managers to
manage (including the power to acquire and dispose of) any assets of a plan.
36. ERISA §§ 405(c)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1105(c)(1), (2) (Supp. V 1975) provide:
(c)(1) The instrument under which a plan is maintained may expressly provide for
procedures (A) for allocating fiduciary responsibilities (other than trustee responsi-
bilities) among named fiduciaries, and (B) for named fiduciaries to designate per-
sons other than named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary responsibilities (other than
trustee responsibilities) under the plan.
(2) If a plan expressly provides for a procedure described in paragraph (1), and
pursuant to such procedure any fiduciary responsibility of a named fiduciary is
allocated to any person, or a person is designated to carry out any such responsibil-
ity, then such named fiduciary shall not be liable for an act or omission of such
person in carrying out such responsibility except to the extent that-
(A) the named fiduciary violated section 404(a)(1) (which section establishes
the primary benefit, prudence, and diversification requirements for fiduciar-
ies)-
(i) with respect to such allocation or designation,
(ii) with respect to the establishment or implementation of the
procedure under paragraph (1), or
(iii) in continuing the allocation or designation; or
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ERISA specifically confirms the common law consensus that in-
vestment managers, like trustees, serve in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to the trust assets. 37 Moreover, it formally enunciates the
principle that where two or more parties are fiduciaries with respect
to the same assets, each may be held liable for breaches of responsi-
bility by any of the others. 38 This codification of a co-fiduciary
theory, coupled with ERISA's express recognition of the form and
function of the directed trust, places the directed trustee in an un-
reasonably awkward position. ERISA approves the settlor's intent
to divide the trust duties among different parties, but totally evis-
cerates that intent by holding the directed trustee responsible for
acts specifically delegated to another.
Directed trustees were dealt a further blow by the enactment of
ERISA section 410(a) which explicitly voids exculpatory provisions
(B) the named fiduciary would otherwise be liable in accordance with
subsection (a).
37. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (Supp. V 1975) establishes the threshold
requirements for ERISA fiduciaries:
(21)(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary
with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any author-
ity or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect
to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility
to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility
in the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person designated under
section 405(c)(1)(B).
(Subparagraph B details circumstances not customarily applicable to the manager of a di-
rected trust) ERISA § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38) (Supp. V 1975) specifies:
(38) The term "investment manager" means any fiduciary (other than a trustee or
named fiduciary, as defined in section 402(a)(2))-
(A) who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset of a plan;
(B) who is (i) registered as an investment adviser under the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940; (ii) is a bank, as defined in that Act; or (iii) is an
insurance company qualified to perform services described in subparagraph
(A) under the laws of more than one State; and
(C) has acknowledged in.writirfg that he is a fiduciary with respect to the
plan.
38. ERISA § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
(a) In addition to any liability which he may have under any other provision of this
part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary
responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan in the following
circumstances:
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or
omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 404(a)(1) in the administration of his
specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, he has enabled
such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.
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as against public policy. 9 There is little doubt that Congress in-
tended to strictly prohibit such provisions, for sections similar to
410(a) were submitted with various drafts of the House and Senate
bills which eventually were synthesized into ERISA.10
The directed trustee may feel that section 405(d)(1) grants partial
relief from the harshness of section 410(a). Section 405(d)(1) pro-
vides:
(d)(1) If an investment manager or managers have been appointed
under section 402(c)(3), then, notwithstanding subsections (a)(2)
and (3) and subsection (b), no trustee shall be liable for the acts
or omissions of such investment manager or managers, or be under
an obligation to invest or otherwise manage any asset of the plan
which is subject to the management of such investment manager '
39. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
(a) Except as provided in sections 405(b)(1) and 405(d), any provision in an agree-
ment or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or
liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as
against public policy.
40. See, e.g., S. 1557, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(g)(1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SEcuRrrY ACT OF 1974, at 314-15 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY], which stated:
(g) No fiduciary may be relieved from any responsibility, obligation, or duty under
this Act by agreement or otherwise. Nothing herein shall preclude any agreement
allocating specific duties or responsibilities among fiduciaries, or bar any agreement
of insurance coverage or indemnification affecting fiduciaries, but no such agree-
ment shall restrict the obligations of any fiduciary to a plan or to any participant
or beneficiary.
In introducing S. 1557, which was designed to amend the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclo-
sure Act, Senator Javits remarked that exculpatory provisions had no place in employee
benefit plans, despite any usefulness they might serve in testamentary trusts. He further
explained that the large numbers of people and enormous amounts of money involved in such
plans, coupled with the public interest in their financial soundness, required that no such
provisions be permitted. 119 CONG. REC. 12076 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits), reprinted in
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 277. See also H.R. 9824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(g) (1973),
reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 733, which stated:
(g) Except as provided in subsection (e)(1)(B) of this section, any provision in an
agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility
or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this title shall be void
as against public policy.
For additional congressional comments on, and proposed prohibitions of, exculpatory clauses,
see, e.g., S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 15(g) (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 177-
78; S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
620; S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501(d)(14) (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
954-55; H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(g) (1973), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
2289-90; H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(g) (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
3954-55; H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 320-21 (1974), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 4587-88; 120 CONG. REc. 29932 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams),
reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 4743; 120 CONG. REc. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Javits), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 4771.
41. ERISA § 405(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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This statutory exclusion applies only to directed trusts created in
accordance with section 402(c)(3) and only absolves the trustee from
liability for two of the three circumstances which give rise to liabil-
ity under section 405. It relieves the trustee from liability if the
trustee fails to comply with section 404 and thereby enables the
manager to commit a breach. 2 It also absolves the directed trustee
from liability if it fails to "make reasonable efforts under the cir-
cumstances" to remedy a breach by the manager.4 3
Both of these exclusions are consistent with the form and function
of the directed trust.4 Since the trustee is required by the trust
instrument simply to implement the adviser's directions and not to
make any inquiries as to the appropriateness or wisdom of the deci-
sions, the directed trustee should have no cause to review the sub-
stance of the manager's directions or to monitor the assets them-
selves. The trustee should not be required to anticipate the ways in
which its conduct might trigger a breach of duty by the manager.
The trustee should not have to constantly evaluate investment ac-
tivity or take affirmative steps to block any transaction which it
feels is unwise. Requiring such involvement would defeat the com-
pany's purpose of divesting the trustee of investment decision-
making power. In addition, the imposition of section 405(a)(2) or
(a)(3) liability on the directed trustee would interfere severely with
the efficient management of investments. Lengthy trustee investi-
gations or even protracted court proceedings might be necessary if
the directed trustee were bound to ensure that its actions did not
enable the manager to commit a breach of duty or if the trustee were
bound to comply with the amorphous "reasonable efforts" standard
in section 405(a)(3).
The one situation in which section 405(d)(1) does not relieve the
trustee of liability is enunciated in section 405(a)(1). That section
provides that a directed trustee may be held liable for an investment
manager's breach if the trustee knowingly participates in, or know-
ingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other fidu-
ciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach. 5 Although the
directed trustee should not be relieved of liability for actively initi-
ating or collaborating in the planning of conduct prohibited by
ERISA, it should not be held liable merely for serving in a passive
42. See ERISA § 405(a)(2), the text of which appears at note 38 supra.
43. See ERISA § 405(a)(3), the text of which appears at note 38 supra.
44. Section 405(d)(1) also relieves the trustee of liability for acts prohibited by subsection
405(b) which deals with express co-trustee relationships. This protection is of little relevance
to the directed trustee, however, as few directed trusts operate with more than one trustee.
45. ERISA § 405(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975);
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role." It is not clear from the statute itself what acts are prohibited
or what standards will be used to assess a defendant's "knowledge."
The directed trustee is a fiduciary; furthermore, it provides custody
of fund assets, settlement of trades and periodic accounting with
regard to the trust assets. If courts construe "knowledge" as any-
thing less than intentional initiation of or active collaboration in
investment misconduct, it is possible that directed trustees may be
held liable for activities of advisers in which they, the trustees, took
absolutely no active role. It therefore is necessary to explore the
concept of "knowledge"-or scienter-as the courts may and should
define it and to examine how these interpretations apply to the
directed trustee's activities.
THE CONCEPT OF SCIENTER AND DIRECTED TRUSTEE LIABILITY
To date, the federal courts have not had an opportunity to inter-
pret the concept of "knowledge" under section 405(a)(1). The legis-
lative history of ERISA offers little guidance. 7 In order to determine
the interpretation that future courts may adopt, it may be helpful
to examine the concept of scienter ("knowingly") as it is defined in
those areas of the law which treat the issues pertinent to retirement
trusts as well as those which have undertaken the most comprehen-
sive analysis of the subject. Breaches of fiduciary duty by trustees
traditionally have been governed by common law fraud theories.
Alternatively, courts interpreting federal securities laws recently
have focused considerable attention on the proper interpretation of
scienter. In 1977 the Seventh Circuit decided, in Daniel v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters," that a beneficiary's inter-
est in a pension plan is a security. Subject to modification or rever-
46. For additional discussion of the directed trustee's custodial duties, see text accompa-
nying notes 14-16 supra.
47. The only references to the scope of the directed trustee's liability appear in the Confer-
ence Report which accompanied ERISA. The Report indicated that if a retirement plan
manager permits the appointment of an investment manager, the named fiduciary may do
so, and the directed trustee "would not be liable for the acts or omissions of the investment
manager." The Report also stated that the plan may also provide that the trustee is to be
subject to the direction of a named fiduciary with respect to the investment decisions. "In
this case, if the trustee properly follows the instructions of the named fiduciaries, the trustee
generally is not to be liable for losses which arise out of following these instructions." H. CONF.
REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 301-02 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5082-83. However, while this language seems to indicate that Congress intended
that a directed trustee should be statutorily exculpated from liability for acting under the
investment manager's directions, it does not invalidate the seemingly contrary provisions in
section 405(a)(1). In addition, section 405(d)(2) specifically provides that subsection 405(d)
is not intended to free the trustee from liability for its own acts. For analysis of this enigmatic
provision, see text accompanying note 79 infra.
48. 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977).
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sal by the Supreme Court on review, Daniel may foreshadow in-
creasing application of federal securities principles to retirement
trusts, a prospect none too appealing to plan sponsors or trustees.
The common law concept of scienter has its roots in Derry v.
Peek,4" a leading English case in which the House of Lords held that
a finding of conscious misrepresentation was necessary in order to
maintain an action for deceit.50 Professor Prosser and other com-
mentators believe that many courts only pay lip service to the case
and find liability for deceit where misrepresentations are made
without actual intent." The precise standard is unclear. Professor
Loss, in discussing the relationship between the securities law and
common law concepts of knowledge noted: "Scienter under the com-
mon law has been defined as everything from knowing falsehood
with an implication of mens rea, through the various gradations of
recklessness down to nonaction such as is virtually equivalent to
liability without fault. '5 2
Although there is no consensus among courts as to the common
law requirement of scienter,5 3 a majority of jurisdictions have held
that recklessness54 or conscious ignorance55 of the truth or falsity of
49. 118991 14 A.C. 337. Defendants, directors of a tramway corporation, issued a prospec-
tus in conjunction with a public stock offering. The prospectus contained the unqualified
assertion that "the company has the right to use steam or mechanical motor power instead
of horses." The company did not actually have that right. The plaintiff who purchased stock
in reliance on the statement brought an action for deceit. The court held that mere negligence
was insufficient to maintain the action; rather, it was necessary to prove the false representa-
tion had been made 1) knowingly, 2) without belief of its truth, or 3) recklessly, i.e., careless
of the truth or falsity of the representation. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 107 at 699
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
50. See, e.g., Angus v. Clifford, 2 Ch. 449 (1891) in which the defendant, who intended to
state his knowledge truthfully but whose careless use of language created a misstatement,
was held not liable to the plaintiff who was misled thereby. See Bohlen, Misrepresentation
as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REv. 733, 734 n.2 (1929).
51. PROSSERi, supra note 49, at § 107, at 699-70; Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent
to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583, 584, 603 (1958); Bohlen, supra note 50, at 734-35.
52. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1432 (2d ed. 1961).
53. A minority of courts have expanded the concept beyond its traditional bounds (or
perhaps have left the concept behind) and have considered holding defendants liable for
negligent representations or strictly responsible for innocent misrepresentations. PROSSER,
supra note 49, at § 107, at 710-14; Bucklo, Scienter-Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 572
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo-Scienter.
54. See, e.g., Zager v. Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 88 S.E.2d 94 (1955); Otis & Co. v. Grimes, 97
Colo. 219, 48 P.2d 788 (1935).
55. See, e.g., Joseph Greenspon's Son's Pipe Corp. v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 133 S.W.2d
426, 428 (Mo., 1939), where the court stated:
It is, of course, not necessary in order to make out a case of fraudulent representa-
tion that the defendant should have actual knowledge that the facts stated by him
were false, but instead it will suffice if it be shown that he made the particular
representation with consciousness that he was without knowledge as to their truth
or falsity, when, in fact, they were untrue.
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a statement or action qualify as scienter. According to Professor
Prosser, there is general agreement that scienter is present when the
representation is made without belief as to its truth or with reckless
disregard of whether it is true or not,5 and that "all courts have
extended [scienter] to include representations made by one who is
conscious that he has no sufficient basis of information to justify his
belief. 57
Finally, as Justice Goldberg pointed out in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc.,"5 any evaluation of the contours of common
law fraud requires an examination of "the nature of the relief
sought, the relationship between the parties and the merchandise
in issue." 9 Perhaps the relaxation of the stringent standards is due
both to the expansion of the concept of fiduciary duties and to the
changing patterns of commerce which involve not only transactions
of land and other tangible goods, but also the sale of securities and
other intangibles. 0
The concept of scienter under the securities laws has also been in
a state of flux. Standards of negligence, recklessness, constructive
fraud, among others, have all been adopted on occasion.' One com-
mentator concluded in 1972 that "proof of an intention to mislead
has been eliminated as an element of proof under Rule 10b-5.""2
Although the majority of federal courts have required either actual
knowledge of the falsity of the misstatement or a reckless disregard
of the truth to establish scienter under 10b-5,13 at least three circuits
have moved in the direction of recognizing a negligent intent under
that rule. 4
See also Hollerman v. F.H. Peavey & Co., 269 Minn. 221, 130 N.W.2d 534(1964); Sovereign
Pocohontas Co. v. Bond, 120 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
56. PROSSER, supra note 49, at § 107, at 700-01.
57. Id. The requisite state of mind must be inferred from circumstances, and the unrea-
sonableness of a belief may be very strong evidence that the defendant does not in fact hold
the belief.
58. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
59. Id. at 193.
60. PROSSER, supra note 49, at § 107, at 710-14.
61. See Bucklo-Scienter, supra note 53, at 567.
62. Id. at 573.
63. Id. See also Comment, Scienter & SEC Injunction Suits, SEC v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., and World Radio Missions, Inc., 90 HARV. L. REv. 1018 (1977). Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1975), promulgated under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), is the primary antifraud provision under the federal securities laws.
Interpretations of that rule, therefore, provide the greatest insight into the concept of scienter
as construed under the securities laws.
64. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.
1967); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
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In the recent case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,5 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari specifically to "resolve the question of
whether a private cause of action would lie under section 10b of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 in the absence
of any allegation of scienter."" The Court answered this question in
the negative. However, although the Court ruled out negligence as
a basis for rule 10b-5 liability, its discussion did not clarify what
state of mind is necessary to establish the requisite intent element. 7
While the Court initially defined scienter as a "mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud," 8 it specifically
left open the possibility that reckless behavior might be sufficient."
In fact, one commentator who undertook an extensive analysis of
scienter standards under Hochfelder and subsequent lower court
cases concluded that "the great bulk of decisions and the more
influential scholarly commentators that have considered the ques-
tion have argued that recklessness should suffice for liability under
Rule 10b-5."70
Further, the Court's analysis, terminology, and supporting cita-
tions could sustain three inconsistent interpretations of the meaning
of scienter: intent, knowledge, or recklessness.7 Predictably, lower
65. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The factual background of Hochfelder is as follows: Leston Nay,
president of First Securities Company committed suicide and left a note stating that his
actions had left the firm bankrupt, and that he had converted to his own use funds that the
plaintiff investors believed had been placed in escrow. Nay had concealed the identity of the
escrow accounts from auditors by utilizing a "mail rule" under which he alone opened all mail
addressed to him. The plaintiff investors charged Ernst & Ernst, First Securities' indepen-
dent accountants, with aiding and abetting May's fraud in violation of section 10(b) by their
failure to investigate First Securities' internal accounting control procedures. The district
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the negligent inaction of the accountants could be the basis for an aiding and
abetting action under rule 10b-5. See also Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define
Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213, 215-16 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Bucklo-Supreme Court].
66. 425 U.S. at 193.
67. See, e.g., Bucklo-Supreme Court, supra note 65, at 214. See also McLean v. Alexan-
der, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D.Del. 1976); Comment, Scienter & SEC Injunction Suits, SEC v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. and World Radio Missions, Inc., supra note 63.
68. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
69. Id. The Court noted:
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional
conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some acts. We need not address here
the question whether in some circumstances reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
70. Bucklo-Supreme Court, supra note 65, at 235. In Bucklo's view, a recklessness stan-
dard would further the policy of investor protection which underlies the federal securities
laws. See also ALI SEC. CODE (1974 Revised Text Draft Nos. 1-3) which defines scienter to
include recklessness. See generally ALI-ABA COMMrIrEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCA-
TION, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR SECURITIES LITIGATION 116-19 (2d ed. 1977).
71. See Bucklo-Supreme Court, supra note 65, at 218-19. The author synthesized the
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courts have been unable to agree on Hochfelder's requirements.
Some jurisdictions have found "wanton ignorance,"7 or "reckless
disregard for the truth"" sufficient; others have required
"willfulness" 74 or "actual knowledge."75 The courts that set the
above standards each cited Hochfelder as authority for their diver-
gent tests.
Whether common law tort or federal securities principles are ap-
plied, it is possible that some of the directed trustee's purely admin-
istrative functions may subject it to liability under section
405(a)(1). Although considerable confusion remains in both areas as
to the precise definition of scienter, it appears that something less
than actual intent, e.g., recklessness, may be sufficient to inculpate
a defendant." In addition, the duty owed to retirement plan partici-
pants is of the highest nature," and courts interpreting section
405(a)(1) therefore may be inclined to follow those cases which con-
strue the concept of scienter most broadly. Most unfortunately,
some thoughts of those involved in the drafting of ERISA highlight
a further concern for finding the trustee liable for the manager's
breaches of duty. It was apparently reasoned that the trustee should
be held liable despite its pure ministerial role because it generally
would have greater resources to satisfy any judgment than would
the investment manager.7" The possibility that this "deep pocket"
implications of this indefinite reasoning as follows:
At first glance, therefore, Ernst & Ernst appears to define scienter as Humpty
Dumpty would-"it means just what [the Justices] choose it to mean-nothing
more, nothing less." Such ambiguity leaves litigants, commentators and lower
courts in doubt as to the proper culpability standards under rule lOb-5 and free,
much as Alice feared, to "make [the Justices'] words mean so many different
things."
Id. at 215.
72. See, e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 534 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976).
73. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1084 (D.Del. 1976).
74. See, e.g., Entin v. Borg, 412 F. Supp. 508, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
75. See, e.g., Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
76. However, authorities have suggested that the limits of actionable fraud are now
broader under common law than they are under the securities laws. See, e.g., ALI-ABA
COMMIrrEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, RESOURCE MATERIALS FOR SECURITIES
LITIGATION 118 (2d ed. 1977).
77. See, e.g., ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975) which
defines the trustee's standard of care:
[a] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and . . .
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like charac-
ter and with like aims. ...
78. These thoughts were expressed by various Congressional staff people during a visit in
1972 with representatives of the Corporate Fiduciaries of Illinois to discuss possible revisions
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theory might influence courts certainly is not a comforting thought
to directed trustees.
The directed trustee usually retains legal custody of the trust
assets and settles any trade initiated by the manager. It records
exchanges of cash and securities on the trust books. It reports peri-
odically to the plan sponsor regarding activity in the trust account
and submits lists of the assets held by the trust. It compiles trust
accounting statements cataloguing all securities. These activities
are purely administrative. They do not indicate-either directly or
by inference-that the directed trustee acted in collusion with the
manager, or that it actively participated in any financial conspir-
acy, mismanagement, or cover-up. On the contrary, the exercise of
these duties reflects no involvement whatsoever by the directed
trustee in the investment decision-making process. However, the
directed trustee may be deemed to be aware of the investments in
question if it has settled the trade and recorded it in some manner.
If the "knowledge" required under section 405(a)(1) encompasses
"reckless" conduct, it is possible that a court may find a trustee
"reckless" if the trustee is aware of a decision the court finds impro-
per, but does not take appropriate action to correct the impropriety.
It is very possible that a court might find a trustee to have know-
ingly participated in or knowingly concealed a breach by the ad-
viser, even though the directed trustee would argue that it is a mere
custodian of the trust assets and has no cause to review either the
substance of the manager's directions or the assets under the man-
ager's control. Nevertheless, given the fluctuating standards for
"knowledge" under analogous case law, ERISA's high standard for
fiduciary responsibility, and the corporate trustee's historical finan-
cial stability, such results are conceivable, if not probable.
POTENTIAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 405(d)(2)
The final and most enigmatic source of potential directed trustee
liability is ERISA section 405(d)(2) which states: "Nothing in this
and ramifications of the draft language of ERISA. One suggestion proposed by the CFI was
to adopt the following language in the proposed Bills so as to avoid the problems now being
faced by a directed trustee:
No fiduciary may be relieved from any responsibility, obligation or duty under this
Act by agreement or otherwise provided, however, nothing herein shall preclude any
agreement allocating specific responsibilities, obligations or duties among fiduciar-
ies in which event such a fiduciary to whom certain responsibilities, obligations or
duties have not been allocated shall not be liable either individually or as a fidu-
ciary for any loss resulting to the fund arising from the acts or omissions to act on
the part of another fiduciary to whom such responsibilities, obligations or duties
have been allocated.
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subsection shall relieve any trustee of any liability under this part
for any act of such trustee.""9 The legislative history is silent as to
Congress' intended meaning for this provision. If read literally, the
provision suggests that the directed trustee should be held liable for
all acts prohibited under section 405(a), notwithstanding the exclu-
sion in subsection 405(d)(1). This analysis would render section
405(d)(1) meaningless, a result hardly consistent with any legiti-
mate method of statutory interpretation.
Another possible interpretation is that Congress intended that the
trustee be held liable for all acts other than those excluded by sec-
tion 405(d) (1). However, if this interpretation is correct, the subsec-
tion could have been so phrased. Moreover, there is no need for the
provision. Since section 405(d)(1) creates only a limited exclusion,
it is assumed, as a standard rule of interpretation, that the directed
trustee could be held liable for any acts outside the scope of the
exclusion.
Finally, it might be argued that subsection 405(d)(2) merely
means that the directed trustee should not be relieved of liability
for its own discretionary acts. Perhaps Congress wanted to make
certain that the exclusion provision would not be extended beyond
the context of the directed trust. Again, this intent could have been
enunciated more clearly than the language of 405(d)(2) indicates. In
addition, the liability remaining under section 405(a)(1) appears
sufficient to cover any discretionary acts by the trustee. If nothing
else is accomplished by the inclusion of this obscure provision, it
highlights Congress' apparent concern to include the trustee well
within the scope of liability expressed throughout Part I of ERISA.
MEANS OF PROTECTING THE DIRECTED TRUSTEE UNDER ERISA
ERISA threatens the directed trustee with several sources of po-
tential liability for the acts of investment managers. The scope of
its liability is still uncertain. The directed trustee may be in great
peril if it relies merely on the statutory exclusions found in section
405(d)(1). To reduce the exposure to liability, the directed trustee
should have protective provisions included in the trust agreement.
Several approaches have been suggested.
As a first approach, the directed trustee may retain a veto power
over the selection of the investment manager. This would allow the
trustee to review the choice of the organization or individual for
whose acts it later may be held responsible. The directed trustee can
thus ensure that the investment authority is given to a manager
79. ERISA § 405(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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with whom it is comfortable, one who, the trustee hopes, will be
unlikely to direct the acquisition or retention of improper invest-
ments. This approach may help reduce the trustee's potential liabil-
ity exposure, but it does not provide the breadth of protection the
directed trustee deserves.
As a second approach, the directed trustee may maintain some
sort of screening process or review over the directed investments.
Two general types of monitoring schemes have been employed. One
involves what has been termed "fail-safe" screening. Under this
scheme, a set of guidelines to detect bad risk investments is estab-
lished. The trust investments are reviewed periodically according to
those guidelines. If any decision fails to pass the screen, the plan
sponsor and the manager are notified immediately so that corrective
action may be commenced. If nothing else, this program should
reinforce the trustee's claim of good faith by showing that it took
appropriate steps to remedy a breach. It also may detect bad invest-
ments before losses become severe. However, the trustee will be
protected only to the extent that the guidelines adopted are deemed
appropriate by the courts,80 and only to the extent that the screen
does not allow any bad investments to slip through without notice.
Judicial standards, of course, are subject to constant change, mak-
ing it even more difficult for the directed trustee to rely on the
screen as a mirror of the current law.
As a variation of the "fail-safe" plan, the directed trustee may
retain a veto power over any directions given by the manager. For
this power to be valuable, however, the trustee must substantively
review each direction to determine whether or not to comply. In
order to obtain maximum protection, the trustee also should moni-
tor continuously the effects of past investment directions to see if
the manager's investments have become inappropriate for the trust.
Under this system the trustee must substitute its investment discre-
tion for that of the manager, a result diametrically opposed to that
intended by the company in creating the directed trust. Although
this program is likely to arrest some inappropriate investment deci-
sions, the duplication of effort and cost required to maintain it may
80. There is little agreement among post-ERISA commentators or courts as to what
constitute permissible or prudent investments. For discussion of various schools of thought,
see, e.g., the collection of articles in ABA Nat'l Institute Proceedings, 1975, 31 Bus. LAW. 3
(1975); Knickerbocker, Fiduciary Responsibility Under the Pension Reform Act, 10 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 495 (1975); Osborne, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
and Fiduciary Responsibility, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 298 (1976); Note, Economic Analysis and
the Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA: Efficiency Versus the Public Interest, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J.
683 (1976).
[Vol. 9
Directed Trustees under ERISA
well negate any benefits to be gained by allocating investment au-
thority to an investment manager in the first place.
From the trustee's point of view, neither of these variations pro-
vide the protection due the directed trustee in its primarily cus-
todial role. Screening or monitoring may aid in keeping unwise deci-
sions from escalating into major catastrophes. However, by initiat-
ing and maintaining an evaluation program, the directed trustee
may be guaranteeing its liability under section 405(a)(1) for any acts
of the investment manager. If it has actively undertaken to oversee
that decision-making process, a court likely will find the trustee to
have satisfied the requirements of "knowledge" and/or
"participation" under that subsection.
Each of the approaches explained so far requires surveillance by
the trustee and does not eliminate the specter of liability. If the
directed trustee instead decides to assume its proper role by taking
only the administrative action necessary to implement the man-
ager's investment decisions, it might consider an agency defense if
it is sued for participating in the adviser's mismanagement. It could
be argued that as a mere agent of the company-or of the manager,
for that matter-it had no power or occasion to exercise any review
or control over the investment decisions and hence, lacked the req-
uisite "knowledge" under section 405(a)(1) of any wrongful activity.
This defense accurately reflects the company's intent to make the
trustee little more than a custodian of the assets. However, the
possibility that a court might impute "knowledge" of a breach to a
properly inactive directed trustee substantially lessens the utility of
this defense.
Given the troublesome "knowledge" standard in ERISA section
405(a)(1), none of the approaches discussed above guarantees the
security the directed trustee deserves when it accepts such a limited
role. The method best suited to ensure that security is an indemnity
agreement between the trustee and the plan sponsor. In a typical
indemnity agreement, the plan sponsor would agree to accept full
financial responsibility for any liability assessed against the trustee
in its capacity as directed trustee.8 ' The agreement should cover all
81. An example of an indemnity provision which defines the test of "knowledge" which
should be applied to exclude the acts of the trustee in its custodial role is as follows:
The Trustee shall not be liable or responsible for any loss resulting to the Trust
Fund by reason of any sale or investment made pursuant to the direction of an
investment manager nor by reason of the failure to take any action with respect to
any investment which was acquired pursuant to any such direction in the absence
of further directions of such investment manager. Notwithstanding anything in this
Agreement to the contrary, the Trustee shall be indemnified and saved harmless
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losses, including legal fees, which might be incurred when the trus-
tee either follows the manager's directions or refrains from acting in
the absence of directions.
ERISA, in its final form, does not treat the suitability of indemn-
ity agreements between trustees and sponsors of directed retirement
trusts. Several of the early congressional bills, however, expressly
approved such arrangements.12 The absence of any comment in the
final draft is perplexing. At the very least, it suggests that Congress
did not intend unequivocally to prohibit indemnity agreements as
it had exculpatory provisions. Both arrangements are similar in
their effects on the directed trustee: both relieve the trustee from
financial responsibility for the acts of the investment manager. To
that extent it is unusual that Congress prohibited one and not the
other. Nevertheless, Congress' implicit approval of indemnity agree-
ments is justifiable on more than one ground. First, indemnity
agreements, while absolving the trustee, do not disturb an injured
party's ability to obtain relief: they merely determine who ulti-
mately will satisfy any judgment assessed against the trustee.
Therefore, indemnity agreements do not interfere with ERISA's
manifest purpose of protecting plan beneficiaries."3 Exculpatory
by the Company from and against any and all personal liability to which the
Trustee may be subjected by carrying out any directions of an investment manager
issued pursuant hereto or for failure to act in the absence of directions of the
investment manager including all expenses reasonably incurred in its defense in the
event the Company fails to provide such defense; provided, however, the Trustee
shall not be so indemnified if it participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes
to conceal, an act or omission of an investment manager, having actual knowledge
that such act or omission is a breach of a fiduciary duty; provided further, however,
that the Trustee shall not be deemed to have knowingly participated in or know-
ingly undertaken to conceal an act or omission of an investment manager with
knowledge that such act or omission was a breach of fiduciary duty by merely
complying with directions of an investment manager or for failure to act in the
absence of directions of an investment manager or by reason of maintaining ac-
counting records.
82. See, e.g., S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 15(g) (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 177-78, which provided in part:
Nothing herein shall preclude any agreement allocating specific duties or responsi-
bilities among fiduciaries, or bar any agreement of insurance coverage or indemnifi-
cation affecting fiduciaries, unless specifically disapproved by the Secretary.
See also S. 1557, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(g) (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
314-15; S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501(d)(14) (1973), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
at 954-55; H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(f) (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
3780.
83. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (Supp. V 1975), which reads:
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce
and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of finan-
cial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of con-
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provisions merely state that the trustee is not liable, so it is possible
that their use may impede an injured party's ability to obtain relief.
Indemnity agreements more closely comport with the form and
function of directed trusts than exculpatory provisions. The sponsor
usually has total discretion over the choice of the manager and
specifically intends the trustee to have neither any initial input nor
any voice in the day to day management of investments. It makes
sense, then, that the sponsor, not the trustee, should bear the pri-
mary responsibility for overseeing the manager's activities. Excul-
patory provisions relieve the trustee of responsibility but do not
otherwise allocate the burden of monitoring the decisions of the
manager. As ERISA is designed in part to protect the beneficiaries
of retirement trusts, it is highly likely that Congress intended, by
its silence, to give implicit, if tentative, approval to indemnity
agreements.
ERISA section 410(b) lends further support to indemnity agree-
ments by expressly upholding the trustee's and the plan's rights to
obtain certain kinds of insurance to cover breaches of duty by plan
fiduciaries. 4 An indemnity agreement is a type of insurance, and
section 410(b)(2) specifically allows fiduciaries to purchase insur-
ance to cover liability for breaches of their own duties." Section
410(b)(1) does require that insurance purchased by a plan to cover
fiduciaries' liability must permit recourse by the insurer against the
duct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and
by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts.
84. ERISA § 410(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(b) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
(b) Nothing in this subpart shall preclude-
(1) a plan from purchasing insurance for its fiduciaries or for itself to cover liability
or losses occurring by reason of the act or omission of a fiduciary, if such insurance
permits recourse by the insurer against the fiduciary in the case of a breach of a
fiduciary obligation by such fiduciary;
(2) a fiduciary from purchasing insurance to cover liability under this part from and
for his own account; or
(3) an employer or an employee organization from purchasing insurance to cover
potential liability of one or more persons who serve in a fiduciary capacity with
regard to an employee benefit plan.
85. Cf. H.R. Con. Res. 609, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATivE HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 4771, where Senator Javits explained why the Act required that insurance
obtained by the sponsor provide for recourse against the breaching fiduciary. The purpose of
the qualification was to spare the plan-and its participants and beneficiaries-the expense
of exorbitant premiums in the absence of recourse provisions. There is no justification, ac-
cording to Senator Javits, for plan participants and beneficiaries to have to shoulder the
burden of subsidizing breaches of fiduciary responsibility committed by their trustees. Those
remarks suggest that at least Senator Javits did not favor the sponsor bearing the financial
responsibility for the trustee's actions. However, if the goal of the provision is to keep prem-
iums low, that end may be achieved with or without indemnity agreements; the presence of
recourse provisions, not the absence of indemnity provisions, is what keeps premiums low.
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fiduciary in case of a breach of a fiduciary obligation. However, that
subsection does not prohibit the sponsor from agreeing indepen-
dently to indemnify the directed trustee for any such liability. The
Department of Labor reinforced the validity of indemnity agree-
ments under ERISA by issuing an interpretive bulletin expressly
permitting them."
Thus, the directed trustee can most effectively protect itself from
unwarranted liability by assuming the limited role of a custodian
of the trust assets, confining its activities to the administrative
tasks required under the trust agreement, and incorporating an in-
demnity provision in the trust agreement. The trustee should not
accept any indemnity without some preliminary review of the com-
pany's financial position. The promise of indemnity will be of little
value if the sponsor is not financially stable enough to satisfy the
liabilities that may be assessed against the trustee in the future. In
addition, it may be helpful for the trustee to obtain a written opin-
ion from the sponsor's counsel stating that the indemnity agreement
is valid against and binding on the sponsor under the terms of the
sponsor's charter and by-laws and any relevant state statutes or case
law.
CONCLUSION
The directed trust is a well established and potentially effective
means for dividing retirement trust duties among various invest-
ment managers. However, if the efficiencies intended by the separa-
tion of functions are to be maintained, each party-and specifically
the directed trustee-should be held responsible only for its own
discretionary acts. If the directed trustee is held liable for the invest-
ment adviser's mismanagement, it would have to take steps to pro-
tect itself by policing the very functions it was not supposed to
perform. Parties to pre-ERISA directed trusts avoided this unwar-
ranted duplication of effort by the use of exculpatory provisions.
In enacting ERISA, Congress recognized the directed trust and
specifically approved the use of the investment manager. Thereby,
Congress tacitly endorsed the plan sponsor's intent to retain the
directed trustee in a purely administrative or custodial capacity.
Yet the drafters impeded efficient functioning of directed trusts by
voiding exculpatory provisions. They confused the scope of directed
trustee liability by prohibiting "knowing" breaches, while at the
same time failing to define "knowledge." Finally, Congress enacted
86. ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 75-4, [19761 3 PENS. AND PROFIT SHARING (P-H)
110,048.
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section 405(d)(2), which emphasizes a general desire to hold the
trustee liable for wrongdoing, but does not enunciate the appropri-
ate scope of that liability.
The directed trustee can attempt to protect itself from unwar-
ranted liability under ERISA by obtaining a comprehensive in-
demnity agreement from the plan sponsor. Nevertheless, the specter
of statutory liability under ERISA remains. The courts eventually
will interpret ERISA's liability provisions, but it is uncertain
whether that evolution will generate the definitive standards that
parties to directed trusts need to plan and implement retirement
trusts efficiently. Congress would do well to end the confusion and
concern by clarifying the meaning of "knowledge" and by explain-
ing the scope of section 405(d)(2). Most importantly, if the directed
trust is to remain a viable structure for employee benefit plans,
Congress should clearly provide that each fiduciary is responsible
only for acts within its own sphere of discretion.

